It is necessary for theory to keep pace with the times since practice is developing constantly. During the 38th collective study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, the General Secretary Xi Jinping stressed that capital is an important factor of production in the socialist market economy. Standardizing and guiding the development of capital under the conditions of the socialist market economy is not only a major economic issue, but also a major political issue. It is not only a major practical issue, but also a major theoretical issue. It concerns the basic socialist economic system, the basic national policy of reform and opening up, high-quality development and common prosperity, national security and social stability. Therefore, it is necessary to have a good understanding of the defining features of China's capital and the way it works in the new development stage for the all-round realization of socialist modernization.

There are various forms of capital in the socialist market economy. To correctly understand  the defining features of China's capital and the way it works in the new development stage is to make full use of strengths and avoid weaknesses, and to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages. China should set up a traffic light for capital, further improve the management system of negative list of market access, strengthen source governance and industry supervision, strengthen market supervision and anti-monopoly and anti-unfair competition regulation, strengthen effective supervision of capital in accordance with the law, prevent the brutal growth of capital, and support and guide the standardized and healthy development of capital to better serve the goal of building a modern socialist power and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Compared with the 1970s, the game between China, US and Russia today has a completely different background, logic of thinking and security concerns. The strengths of the three great powers have also changed dramatically. The situation is far more complex and fast-moving than the 1970s, and adds more uncertainties to the process of multipolar world.

I. The different strategic thinking in the games of China, US and Russia

The US is committed to maintaining global hegemony. China expects to achieve the goal of socialist modernization in the 21st century, while Russia pursues internal and external security to revive its status as a major country in the world. Both China and Russia hope to promote the establishment of a more equitable and reasonable world order.

II. There is a huge contrast in the security concerns between US and China and Russia, which determines the complexity of the trilateral interaction of the three powers

Based on its geopolitical considerations, the American national security concept takes China and Russia as inevitable opponents to guard against. There are many consistent or similar views on China and Russia's national security concepts, but due to different national conditions, China and Russia have their own emphasis on security concerns. Objectively, the United States and China and Russia have a one-on-two pattern in the geostrategic situation, but it is not a traditional sense of geopolitical confrontation. Strategic competition and differences in management and control have always been an important feature in the trilateral interaction between China, US and Russia.

III. The game between China, US and Russia constitutes an important strategic form of the development of a multipolar world, and the strengths will determine the future of the international pattern.

There is a huge gap in the GDP indicators and the scale of international trade of the three countries. Besides, China, US and Russia attach great importance to the development of scientific and technological innovation, and are among the world's leading militaries, with independent R&D and manufacturing advantages.

IV. Conclusion and Evaluation

The natural endowments and economic strengths are what makes China, US and Russia world-class game forces. Other forces in the process of multi polarization will play around this triangle. The economic complementarity will bring the interaction between China, US and Russia under control. As world-class military powers, China, the United States and Russia have the ability to independently research, develop and manufacture conventional advanced weapons and nuclear weapons, and are more capable of withstanding military attacks than other countries in the world. It is difficult for US to monopolize the world financial market to cause a fatal impact on Russia. The global competition around high-tech will be more intense, and will not stop within the "small yard and high fence" of the US and its allies.

Demographic changes have led to the weakening of America's dominant ethnic group, and the United States is calling for a new national narrative around the question of "who is American." Against the background of social and economic inequality and the continuous development of new media technology, the Democratic and Republican Parties have increasingly relied on identity politics campaign strategies. The Republican Party tells racial stories in favor of whites, and the Democratic Party tells racial stories in favor of minorities. As the competition for the American historical narrative was taken as the core, the racial narrative of the two parties is fully differentiated and polarized, even being widely linked to many issues such as the reform of the law enforcement system and the reform of the electoral rights. Facing the upcoming 2022 midterm elections, the Republican Party has formed a narrative strategy of attacking the Democratic Party's divisive racial education. By comparison, the Democratic Party has tried to shift voters' attention to issues on abortion, gun control and anti-Trump sentiment while continue its narrative strategy of attacking white supremacy. The death of the American Dream and the weakening narrative of the Anglo Saxon story will perpetuate the bipartisan narrative competition over race issues, which has tore apart American social identity, tribalized the United States, intensified inter-ethnic hate crimes, highlighted social contradictions, divided the electorate, covered up economic and class contradictions, decentralized the power used for external affairs, focused its strategy toward China on soft balancing and internal balancing, made the American model less attractive, and made it even more difficult for white civilization to win allies over to form an Anglo Alliance.

Under the background that power’s competition seems to go back to war or cold war, this article analyzes the performance and causes of the failure of the traditional powers' competition model, and the restraints and evolutionary tendency of powers competition model in a long period. It also raises the Sino-US competition as an example to explain that model evolution. The three traditional powers competition models, such as hot war, cold war and pure free market competition, are becoming outmoded due to their internal limitations. Under the circumstances that the interdependence of great powers is far from scattering, the meaning pursuit of powers veers to common recognition, and the frequent occurrence of global crises, powers would be more and more inclined to gain a higher level of meaning and competition advantages through providing material wealth and wisdom contribution to the globe. In the future, the theme of powers competition will depend on the capacity of providing the world with more material wealth, better crisis management schemes and more constructive value orientation and development model. The focus of Sino-US competition is the competition of new thinking. China's unique strategic advantages will make China more available to the new tendency of competition and more likely to win the competition in a win-win way.

The major sign of the unprecedented change in a century is that the world pattern is changing. According to the comparison of comprehensive national strength, the western countries are still dominant in general, but the global hegemony of the western world is coming to an end. On August 27, 2019, during the annual French ambassadors conference, French President Emmanuel Macron has proclaimed, “We are living the end of Western hegemony. We have become accustomed to an international order based on Western hegemony since the 18th century. ”Western hegemony was once the French hegemony that experienced the Enlightenment in the 18th century, the British hegemony that experienced the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, and the American hegemony that had economic and political dominance after two world wars in the 20th century. “Things change. And they are now deeply shaken by the mistakes of Westerners in certain crises, by the choices that have been made by Americans for several years which did not start with the Trump administration,” said French President Macron.

Today, the world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century, and Southeast Asia, which is the priority of China's peripheral diplomacy, is becoming the focus of the game of great powers. Under the increasingly complex international and regional situation, the mentality and policies of Southeast Asian countries towards major powers such as China and the United States have undergone subtle changes, and China-ASEAN relations are facing a complex and delicate situation.

I. The Internal and External Environment Facing Southeast Asia

From an external point of view, major powers, on the one hand, have been increasing their efforts to win over Southeast Asia, and Southeast Asia has ushered in a rare opportunity for development. In addition to China and the United States, ASEAN's relations with Japan, Australia, India, Russia and other countries have also been comprehensively strengthened in the past few years. On the other hand, with the intensification of the game of great powers, Southeast Asian countries are facing increasing external pressure. First, the regional security situation is becoming increasingly tense. Second, regional economic development is beset with difficulties. Third, the regional order is facing the challenge of reconstruction. Internally, the negative effects of political changes in Myanmar continue to ferment, and the process of regional integration faces challenges.

II. Policy Stance in Southeast Asia

Faced with the volatile international and regional situation, Southeast Asian countries responded rationally and pragmatically, targeting strengthening their unity, adhering to independence and self-reliance, and promoting ASEAN integration. First, strategically seeking independence and self-reliance, and striving to maintain the centrality of ASEAN. Second, pursuing the best interests economically and adhering to the principle of cooperating without choosing sides. Third, deepening security cooperation with the United States, but opposing conflicts and wars, and striving to maintain regional peace and stability.

III. The Changing Relationship Between China and Southeast Asia

With the intensification of the great power game, Southeast Asia has gradually become the geopolitical focus. Although the United States tried its best to win over Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian countries did not turn to the United States as the United States wished, and the relationship between China and Southeast Asia is facing a new situation. From the perspective of opportunities, ASEAN hopes to maintain regional peace and stability, strengthen cooperation to ensure regional prosperity and development, increase strategic consensus with China, and the two sides are moving towards building a community with a shared future for mankind. In terms of challenges, the geopolitical game among major countries has intensified, and and the relationship between China and Southeast Asia is facing many uncertainties.

In general, the British government will continue to implement the Global Britain strategy, and will not be content with a regional power in Europe. In fact, it will enhance its influence around the world through its advantages in economy, values, diplomacy, military, culture and technology. Without Johnson's constraints, values diplomacy will be an important part of Liz Truss' foreign policy. She strives to portray herself as a freedom fighter and intervenes in affairs in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region under the pretext of human rights and values. To this end, Truss may continue to maintain a consistent position with the United States in order to use influence and actively use existing bilateral and multilateral agreements to participate in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical game. The UK-EU relations will be affected by the UK economy, but for now, as Truss supporters are mostly pro-Brexit, the UK may still take a tough stance against the EU in the short term.

The new government may lack motivation to improve China-British political relations. Interest in China in the Conservative Party has diminished since Cameron, and negative views are more common. Although the British Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Trade have different attitudes towards China, the role of economic-related factors in their attitudes towards China is declining. Johnson, a self-proclaimed Sinophile, did not invest in improving China-British relations as much as he did on Brexit issues. Although China-UK economic and trade relations are progressing steadily, pressure from the lobby by some anti-China organizations in the UK, the public opinion within the party and the United States have caused the British government to exclude Chinese companies from major infrastructure construction such as 5G and nuclear power plant projects, and suspended China-UK economic and trade relations dialogue. Many research reports have urged the UK government to adopt a more flexible attitude and avoid treating China in a black or white manner. The UK hopes to maintain trade relations and people-to-people exchanges with China, and strengthen cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, culture, education and the environment. However, in the political field, especially in the area of human rights, the United Kingdom will follow the pace of the United States more closely, strengthen its military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, and frequently stir up China's political red line.

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the important cross-strait consensus, the 1992 Consensus, reached by the Association for Relation Across the Taiwan Straits and the Strait Exchange Foundation. The 1992 Consensus is a common understanding of important political values reached by the two sessions of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits in the special context of time and space. It has become an important political basis for cross-strait dialogue and consultation, political party interaction and cross-strait cooperation. It is crucial for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and the anti-secession and pro-reunification forces. It is the stabilizing force which is irreplaceable at this stage and even in the foreseeable future. In the current situation where cross-strait relations continue to deteriorate and face many challenges and dilemmas, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the 1992 Consensus and adhering to the Consensus are of particular significance for promoting the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and the process of peaceful reunification.