In 2021, peaking carbon dioxide emissions and achieving carbon neutrality were two of the most popular topics on the agenda of China's National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Two Sessions, which has generated a lot of interest across the world.

On September 22, 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared at the General Debate of the 75^th Session of the United Nations General Assembly that China will scale up its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions by adopting more vigorous policies and measures, striving to reach a CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Later, on December 12, 2020, President Xi Jinping at the Climate Ambition Summit announced some further commitments for 2030: China will lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by over 65 percent from the 2005 level, increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 25 percent, increase the forest stock volume by 6 billion cubic meters from the 2005 level, and bring its total installed capacity of wind and solar power to over 1.2 billion kilowatts. This series of announcements are solemn commitments made by China to combat global climate change and reduce the intensity of carbon dioxide emissions, demonstrating China's firm determination and responsibility as a great power. At the same time, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee and the Central Economic Work Conference made strategic arrangements for China's commitment to achieving carbon emissions peak and carbon neutrality, requiring a good performance in all areas of work had to be delivered in the course of embarking on a new journey of building a modern socialist country in an all-round way. 

China’s Two Sessions in 2021 stressed the need to actively address climate change, strive to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060 by adopting more effective policies and measures, improve the control of total energy consumption and energy use intensity with focus on controlling fossil energy consumption, implement a system dominated by carbon intensity control and supplemented by total carbon emission control, promote an energy revolution and build a clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient energy system, improve the ability to ensure energy supply, and further promote low-carbon transformation in industry, construction, transportation and other fields.

This paper puts forward the following suggestions on the work of peaking carbon dioxide emissions and achieving carbon neutrality in China:

First, to fully understand the urgent importance of delivering a good performance of carbon dioxide emissions peak and carbon neutralization.

Second, to carry out the principle of prioritizing energy conservation, and reducing the intensity of energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions.

Third, to coordinate diversified energy supply, and develop green and low carbon energy, putting the development of renewable energy in a prominent position.

Fourth, to promote energy revolution and build a clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient modern energy system.

Fifth, to integrate the development of coal with electricity, clean use of coal, and promote the construction of a new power system.

It has always been the practice of the United States to maintain hegemony by targeting and focusing on a peer competitor for its strategic layout. Both the Soviet Union after World War II and the current China are the active choices of the United States. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has been observing, thinking about and actively responding to China's strategic direction until Trump took office and targeted China as a peer competitor, opening the era of strategic competition between China and the United States.

The arrival of the era of strategic competition between China and the United States is due to the changing subjective and objective conditions. It is impossible for China-US relations to go back to the past, and the Biden administration has made it clear that it adheres to a tough stance on China, and its strategic direction is likely to be an innovative combination of Obama and Trump's policies on China. At present, the world is undergoing major changes unseen in a century, and China-US relations are at the crossroads. Both the two countries are waiting to see how the other side will react, and a new strategic consensus needs to be shaped urgently. In light of the changes of the times and Chinese characteristics, China-US relations are different from those of the Soviet Union and the United States for hegemony at that time. At a time of great changes, there is still promising vision in China-US relations. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has written an article calling on China and the United States to establish a managed strategic competition relationship, set up guardrails to prevent disasters and avoid wars.

In view of this, this paper focuses on the analysis of the era of strategic competition between China and the United States, and explores how the era of strategic competition between China and the United States comes and its basic characteristics, the possible strategic trend of the Biden administration and how China will actively respond to it.

I. The Advent of the Era of Strategic Competition Between China and the United States.

Trump takes office at a time when being tough with China is becoming a new strategic consensus in the United States, and China-US relations are beginning to be seen as the most challenging bilateral relationship in the world. Trump has made earth-shaking adjustments to the grand strategy of the United States, putting forward the strategic goal of "making America great again," making "America First" the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy, shifting international responsibilities, promoting equal trade, adjusting regional strategic priorities with a focus on China and the Asia-Pacific region, and clearly regarding China as its primary, comprehensive and global strategic competitor. At the end of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, Trump administration successively issued three security documents, namely, the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, emphasizing the return of the era of great power competition and identifying China as a "revisionist power", the top national security challenge of the United States, and a "strategic competitor". The China-US trade war that began in March 2018 marks the end of the US strategy of economic engagement with China and an important watershed in China-US relations. With this as a sign, the curtain of the era of strategic competition between China and the United States has been violently opened, and the United States has harnessed all areas of national power, including diplomacy, trade, technology, military and people-to-people exchange to engage in an all-around, systematic competition with China in an effort to contain China's development. The United States is aggressive, while China is not willing to be outdone. China-US relations have entered a fierce game period, showing a comprehensive game situation.

II. The Characteristics of the Era of Strategic Competition Between China and the United States.

At present, strategic competition has become a prominent feature of China-US relations. Horizontally, it is an important embodiment of the great power game under the background of great changes unseen in a century; vertically, it is the product of the development of China-US relations to a certain historical stage. The current strategic competition between China and the United States embodies comprehensive characteristics and will have a great bearing on the evolution of the international pattern and the shaping of the world order. On the other hand, the strategic competition between China and the United States has not completely changed the situation of the coexistence of competition and cooperation, and China has also maintained the necessary strategic prudence. Despite the rising strategic pressure from the United States, China is well aware that checks and balances are not a feasible strategic choice, let alone to defuse the pressure by forming alliances with East Asian countries or even providing security protection. Even facing the increasing antagonism in US China policy since 2018, China has repeatedly stressed the need to respond rationally, not to dance with it, and to try its best to avoid strategic confrontation. At present, in the face of international changes, countries all over the world generally encounter difficulties and confusion, and the reform and innovation of development path and development model have become the core of international competition. Who can make a breakthrough and take the lead in the development path and development model, who can occupy an active position in the future international competition. In view of this, the strategic competition between China and the United States is bound to be long-term. It is undeniable that the strategic competition between China and the United States is a difficulty that China must overcome to achieve the "two centenary" goals, and need to deal with cautiously.  

III. The Direction of the Competitive Strategy of the United States Towards China.

The strategic consideration of Biden's policy toward China is to continue strategic competition, pay more attention to the long-term and strategic competition, and the diversity of means of competition, and strive to avoid hand-to-hand combat with China, more emphasis is placed on a consistent policy toward China by forming an alliance of democratic countries. Biden will not take Trump-style radical measures and has shown a relatively moderate position with a better understanding of China on issues related to China's core interests, such as Taiwan. This policy shift provides important conditions for the predictability and controllability of China-US relations, reduces the threat of direct conflict between China and the United States, and effectively prevents the expectation of strategic confrontation between China and the United States. The "positive competition" model put forward by U.S. President Biden and U.S. Secretary of State Blinken meets the expectations of major countries in the world and provides some feasibility for China-US cooperation. On the other hand, the core theme between China and the United States is strategic competition, and the competition between the two sides in values, development models and international rules may be more fierce, and there is a considerable limit to the stability, improvement and development of bilateral relations.

IV. China's strategy Dealing with the Strategic Game between China and the United States.

The strategic direction that China should adhere to is: first, China should do its own thing, promote the benign interaction between China and the world, and provide a solid national foundation for dealing with the strategic competition between China and the United States. Secondly, China should adhere to the bottom line thinking, actively deal with the risk of "decoupling". Third, actively looking for opportunities to promote China-US cooperation. Fourth, promote the formation of an international United front focusing on the steady response to the strategic game between China and the United States.

China and Russia are two great powers linked by mountains and rivers. China-Russian military cooperation is not only an important part of the strategic cooperation between the two countries, but also an important embodiment of the strategic cooperation between the two countries. Today, the world is facing great changes unseen in a century, and relations between major powers are undergoing profound changes and adjustment. China-Russia relations have become the most stable relationship among world major powers, and military cooperation reflects the close degree of relations between the two countries. China-Russian military cooperation covers a wide range of areas and is constantly deepening, which is in line with the national interests of the two countries.

I. China-Russia military cooperation continues to deepen.

The deepening of the overall relationships between China and Russia has promoted the China-Russia military exchanges and cooperation. China and Russia have conducted in-depth military cooperation in the fields of high-level military-to-military contacts, actual combat training, and military-technical cooperation. The good interaction and cooperation on international multilateral occasions have also brought the bilateral military relations to a high level. The two countries will continue to enrich the connotation of the comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation between the two countries in new era and make new contributions to the maintenance of world peace and regional stability.

II. The main factors in the deepening military cooperation between China and Russia.

In international relations, military and security cooperation is a phenomenon only when the level of political mutual trust reaches a certain degree. The deepening of China-Russia military cooperation stems from the fact that the two countries share common strategic needs, "side by side, back-to-back" and relying on each other strategically. China-Russia military cooperation reflects the high degree of mutual trust between the two strategic cooperation partners, in which the heads of state of the two countries have played an important role.   

III. Aspects necessary to pay attention to in China-Russia military cooperation.

It is also necessary to note the impact of the reversal of China-Russian strength in future military cooperation with the widening of the strength gap between the two countries and the approaching level of the two militaries.
In short, great progress has been made in China-Russia military cooperation in the new era, reflecting the high level of China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation. In today's great changes in the world, the United States regards China and Russia as strategic competitors and attempts to piece together the so-called values alliance against China and Russia, which will promote the strengthening cooperation between China and Russia, including cooperation in the military field, but China and Russia will not form a military alliance.

Gaullism is a foreign policy pursued by France for a long time since the end of World War II, and its core is to adhere to independence and firmly safeguard France's national sovereignty and development interests. It is the most important factor for France to play its role as a great power in post-war international affairs and dance well on the international stage. After Macron became president of France, he proposed to "return to Gaullism", which inherited and developed Gaullism and expanded the influence of France. China-France relations have made considerable progress in recent years. China and France are still the major countries with the most common ground on the understanding of international relations and the future of world development, and they are also the countries with the closest positions.

Today’s world is faced with a complicated and volatile international situation. From the perspective of theory and practice, this paper will discuss two noteworthy issues.

I. How to understand and interpret "multilateralism"?

The author believes that, in essence, multilateralism has the following characteristics: the highest organizational form of multilateralism is the United Nations, and the collective principle followed is the Charter of the United Nations. Multilateralism is the only correct choice in the era of economic globalization with peace and development as its theme. Multilateralism also reflects the overall situation of the world strategic pattern, objectively negates the unipolar world theory and affirms the multipolar world. The Communist Party of China and Chinese government have always regarded the multipolarization of the world as a major strategic cognition in formulation of its international strategy and foreign policy. Today, some people are still emphasizing and advocating the bipolar world theory between the United States and China, which is tantamount to advocating unilateralism in disguise, and it also provides a theoretical basis for the United States to regard China as its main competitor and attack its opponent intentionally or unintentionally.

Second, President Xi Jinping made a complete and thorough exposition on multilateralism. The essence is that multilateralism is about having international affairs addressed through consultation and the future of the world decided by everyone working together. No matter it is to build small circles or to start new cold war or to repel, threaten and intimidate others or to decouple from China or to cut off supply chain or to impose sanctions or to create isolation and estrangement, it will all only push the world into division and confrontation.

Third, the differences in multilateralism is not on the so-called definition, and the leaders of some major powers in Western Europe also agree with the opposition between multilateralism and unilateralism.

Fourth, Boao Forum for Asia annual conference in 2021 is another witness to the promotion of multilateralism.

II. How to look at the Russian factor in China-US relations?

First, the development trends and characteristics of the relations with China, the United States and Russia are indeed different. This is not only based on the differences in their respective national conditions, but also on the principles and policies pursued by the authorities, and on political will or political mutual trust. US-Russia relations do not depend on the Chinese factor, and China-US relations do not depend on the Russian factor, too.

Second, China and Russia advocate and practice the "Shanghai spirit" of "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and seeking common development." This means that neither China nor Russia will become an obstacle to the other’s relations with the United States.

Third, the decisive factor in properly handling the relations between great powers is to first take care of one’s own stuff. All great powers should put themselves in the right place, looking at each other on an equal level instead of look down or look up. The Cold War mentality and the zero-sum concept are not desirable in the present era.

In the more than three months since Joe Biden took office, he has put forward spending plans of more than $6 trillion, which are comparable to Roosevelt's "New deal."

I. Biden's big spending is going to be spent where?

In the more than three months since taking office, President Biden has proposed a $1.9 trillion economic stimulus bill, a $2.3 trillion infrastructure plan, a $1.8 trillion the American Families Plan and a $753 billion defense budge for the fiscal year 2022. This series of spending plans is the largest public investment in the United States since the construction of the interstate highway and the space race began in the 1950s, and in the eyes of many, it marks the arrival of a new era of big government.

The Economist published an article on March 13, 2021 entitled Joe Biden’s stimulus is a high-stakes gamble for America and the world. The article writes, "Mr Biden’s stimulus is a big gamble. If it pays off, America will avoid the miserable low-inflation, low-rate trap in which Japan and Europe look stuck. Other central banks may copy the Fed’s new target. Massive fiscal stimulus may become the normal response to recessions. The risk, however, is that America is left with rising debts, an inflation problem and a central bank facing a test of its credibility." The article said: "Mr Biden’s gamble is better than inaction. But nobody should doubt the size of his bet."

II. Who will pay for Biden's big spending plan?

(1) Uncertainty facing Biden in raising corporate income tax.

(2) To implement the fiscal policy of expanding the fiscal deficit.

(3) Attracting global savings will endanger the global economy.

III. The Prospect of Biden's Big Spending Plan and the Future of China-US Relations

Many aspects of Biden's big spending plan will be resisted or even firmly opposed by Republicans, and there is a lot of uncertainty in terms of long-term trends. However, in order to enhance the strength and maintain the status of world leader and global hegemony, the goals of the two parties are the same. The United States has made great efforts to contain China, and the whole world is concerned about the development of China-US relations.

Deng Xiaoping once pointed out that "science and technology are the primary productive forces." Science and technology is an important indicator of a country's hard power, which can produce international attraction, affect a country's international communication, and become the constituent parts of soft power. Reviewing the history of world development, almost every subversive scientific and technological progress has changed the balance of power among great powers, accelerated the rise of emerging powers and the decline of the established power, and promoted the transformation of international system, reshape the new pattern of global politics and economy.

High-tech cooperation between China and Arab countries belongs to a new field, and the mode of cooperation has yet to be formed. The Gulf Arab countries have the financial advantage of developing high technology, while Egypt, Sudan, Iraq and Algeria have population, industrial and market advantages. China is increasingly approaching the center of the world's high-tech stage and is willing to share its high-tech development experience with the vast number of Arab countries. Arab countries seek "diversified" development paths in high-tech fields, especially in aerospace, nuclear energy, new energy, drones, and fifth-generation mobile communication technology (5G) networks, and strive to break the technological monopoly of the West.

China's science and technology diplomacy with Arab countries is an important measure to achieve win-win cooperation among developing countries, bridge the technological gap, promote the world's scientific and technological multipolarization, and promote the common progress of mankind. Starting with the fourth Industrial Revolution, this paper intends to explore the impact of high-tech development on China's national identity and the significance of China-Arab cooperation, analyze the concept, characteristics, realistic influence, top-level design, strategic planning and key areas of China's science and technology diplomacy to China-Arab States, and look forward to the prospect of China's science and technology diplomacy to China-Arab States.

2021 marks the tenth anniversary of the upheaval in the Middle East. At that time, the Western media called this upheaval the "Arab Spring" and "the Arab Awakening", and compared it with the revolution of 1848, the October Revolution of Russia in 1917, and the upheaval in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989. However, instead of revolutionary changes in the Arab world over the past decade, the countries concerned have fallen into unprecedented political instability and economic depression. International political reality is the best textbook. Summarizing and reflecting on the root causes of the tragic results of the upheaval in the Middle East will not only help to deepen political research in the Middle East, but also provide a useful mirror for other countries to improve the level of governance.

Taiwan is an immigrant society dominated by the Han nationality. In the process of historical development, different ethnic groups or groups have emerged in Taiwan society, as well as many special minority social groups that have not been paid attention to in different historical periods. Different ethnic groups or social groups have different social psychological characteristics and complex cross-strait feelings. We often use the so-called four ethnic groups to observe Taiwan's social structure, but in fact, it is not entirely accurate, and we need to understand and observe the phenomenon of special groups in Taiwan society from a micro level, so as to have a comprehensive and historical understanding of the particularity and complexity of Taiwan's social group structure.